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ABSTRACT
The diﬀusion of two competitive, interchangeable, and durable goods is studied under the framework of a
spatial game where consumers are distributed on a two-dimensional square lattice and play3 ×3 symmetric
coordination-like games with their nearest neighbors. There are three strategies, either consuming a product
A or B, or a strategyC of not consuming either A or B. The pay oﬀ matrix of the game contains the positive
eﬀects of network externality, that is, the payoﬀs are increasing functions of the number of agents adopting
the strategies A or B. Both simulations and mean-ﬁeld approximation show that the existence of the positive
eﬀects of the network externalityampliﬁes anyslight initial diﬀerence in the number of agents who adopt
either A or B and eventuallypromotes the superior product to take over the entire market. On the other
hand, without eﬀects of the network externalitythe slight initial diﬀerence is not enlarged and both superior
and inferior products are observed to coexist byforming clusters in the market. Moreover, the eﬀects of
innovation factors that help an inferior product to retake the market are studied. It is shown that both the
timing and size of the innovation factor matter for an inferior product in order to retake the market.
† E-mail address of the corresponding author: mtomochi@uci.edu
1I. INTRODUCTION
Diﬀusion of durable goods is often believed to be explainable bythe logistic model, which originates from
Verhulst (1838) who applied the model to the studies of demography[3,23]. There exist numerous studies
on diﬀusion of durable goods with the logistic model [12], and these studies showed that the logistic model
could replicate the data of full diﬀusion of various durable goods. A discrete version of the logistic model is
given by
pX(t +1 )− pX(t)=λp X(t)( 1− pX(t)) (1)
where pX(t) represents the fraction of the people who alreadyhave a product X at a unit time t and λ is a
constant parameter, which controls the initial slope of the diﬀusion curve. In the logistic model, the diﬀusion
rate pX(t +1 )− pX(t) is given as the multiplication of the parameter λ, pX(t), and 1 − pX(t), that is, the
rate is a function of the fraction of both people who alreadyhave adopted the product bythe time t and
who have not yet.
Besides the studies on diﬀusion phenomena with the logistic model, large numbers of diﬀusion phenomena,
such as expansion of forest ﬁres, disease and so on, have been studied byutilizing the framework of cellular
automata [24]. A studyof diﬀusion of interchangeable and durable goods in a market based on the framework
of the two-dimensional cellular automata is thought to be meaningful because it is commonlyobserved that
people tryto imitate the most successful strategyfrom their local neighbors. This imitation dy namics is
known as “copycat.” The spatialitysuch as local interactions within neighborhood is one of the most
important features of cellular automata. A number of studies show that the eﬀects of physical or abstract
spatialityare critical for people’s behavior [2,7,11,13-19,21]. Under the framework of the cellular automata
based on the two-dimensional square lattice, each consumer on each cell onlyinteracts with his nearest
neighbors. If the ﬁeld is large enough and if the initial seed pX(1) is much smaller than the entire population
in the whole system, then the diﬀusion progresses only gradually.
In such case as a spatial game, the number of neighbors is ﬁxed as eight (the Moore neighborhood) in
2this paper and the updating probability, which Huberman and Glance (1993) introduced, is thought to act
like the parameter λ in Eq. (1) [8]. In the game ﬁeld, consumers who do not have the product X are assumed
to be able to adopt the product X onlywhen there is at least one neighbor who alreadyhas the product X,
that is, onlysuch a neighbor can be a source of copyof the strategythat is to adopt the product X. When
there is at least one neighbor who alreadyhas the product X in a consumer i’s neighborhood, he is assumed
to copyhis neighbor’s strategywith the following updating probability µ(t) that is given as an increasing
function of the fraction of the people who has adopted the product X:
µ(t)=ν(pX(t − 1))ξ (2)
where t is greater than or equal to two, and ν (0 <ν≤ 1) and ξ are parameters. This particular updating
probabilityfunction is one of the arbitraryincreasing functions of the fraction of the people who has adopted
the product X, and it is introduced here since this function with a proper set of parameters ν and ξ gives
the time evolution of pX(t), which is obtained from a simulation, a good ﬁt to the logistic curve with a given
λ in Eq.(1).
Figure 1 shows numericallysolved pX(t) (square dots) in Eq. (1) with the initial value pX(1)=20/1012
and the parameter λ=0.32 and the value pX(t) (black circles) that is obtained as a result of the cellular-
automata based simulation mentioned above with the initial value pX(1)=20/1012 and the parameters ν=1
and ξ =0 .5. In the simulation consumers are placed in the ﬁeld of 101×101 cells of a two-dimensional square
lattice, therefore the size of the whole population |N| is given as 1012. It is observed that two plots in Fig. 1
are almost identical, and it suggests that the pX(t) obtained from the simulation could be described bythe
logistic equation in Eq. (1). This fact will be utilized later in Sec. V where a mean-ﬁeld theoryis conducted
to recover the results of the simulations in Secs. III and IV.
In this paper the diﬀusion phenomena of two competitive, interchangeable, and durable goods are studied
based on the framework of spatial game where consumers are distributed on two-dimensional square lattice
and play3 ×3 symmetric coordination like games with their nearest neighbors [20,25]. The detailed rules
3of the game are explained in the next section. The payoﬀ matrix of the game contains the positive eﬀects
of the network externality, that is, the payoﬀ elements are increasing functions of the number of agents
adopting each strategy. The network externalities play an important role in diﬀusion of interchangeable
goods [1,4-6,9,10]. In Sec. III, the results of simulations based on the rules of the game in Sec. II are shown
to clarifythe pay oﬀ and initial-condition-dependent behavior of the sy stem and the positive eﬀects of the
network externality. The eﬀects of innovation factors that help an inferior product to retake the market
are illustrated in Sec. IV. In Sec. V, a mean-ﬁeld theoryis formulated to approximate the results of the
simulations in Secs. III and IV. Discussions are given in the last section.
II. THE MODEL
Consumers are placed in a two-dimensional square lattice. Each consumer has one of three possible
strategies, consuming either a product A or B, or a strategyC of consuming neither A nor B. Those who
have the strategyC are the potential consumers of either the product A or B in the future. In the following,
adopting either the product A, B, or C is expressed by+1, −1, or 0, respectively, that is, at time t the
consumer in the i-th cell (1 ≤ i ≤| N|) takes a strategy σi(t) that is either +1, −1, or 0. The consumer i
plays one-shot 3×3 symmetric coordination like games with his eight immediate neighbors, denoted as ˜ n(i),
under the payoﬀ matrix given in Table I that describes the payoﬀ matrix for a row player.
In Table I, Ri(±1) denotes a consumer i’s payoﬀ derived from a product itself and is given as
Ri(±1) = r(±1) ± wθi (3)
where the parameter r(±1) is assumed to be greater than zero. The random value θi is uniformlygenerated
between −0.5 and 0.5, and w is assumed to be a positive small number compared to r(±1), that is, 0 <
w   r(±1). Introducing such wθi enables Ri(±1) to contain a small amount of ﬂuctuation reﬂecting the
fact that the utilityobtained from a product is not exactlythe same but slightlydiﬀerent for each other.
4Additionally, introducing such Ri(±1) allows the model to have consumers with slightlybiased preferences
[5].
The enhanced payoﬀs by sharing the same kind of an interchangeable product with neighbors, S(±1,t),
are deﬁned as
S(+1,t)=s(+1)pA(t − 1) and (4)
S(−1,t)=s(−1)pB(t − 1), (5)
respectively, where the parameter s(±1) is assumed to be greater than or equal to zero and pA(t) and
pB(t) represent the fraction of consumers who are adopting the product A or B in the whole population,
respectively, at the timet. Both pA(0) and pB(0) are assumed to be zero, therefore the initial value, S(±1,1),
is also assumed to be zero. The S(±1,t), which is a function of pA(t−1) and pB(t−1), respectively, reﬂects
the eﬀects of the network externalities from the whole population [1]. Because of the assumption that having
a product A or B strictlydominates having neither of these products, the third row in Table I is all ﬁlled
byzeros. This assumption corresponds to the scenario that all agents sooner or later adopt the product A
or B in the diﬀusion process.
The payoﬀ function for the consumer i in a game with a consumer j can be denoted as fi(σi(t),σ j(t)),
that is, fi(+1,+1) = Ri(+1) + S(+1,t), fi(+1,−1) = fi(+1,0) = Ri(+1), fi(−1,−1) = Ri(−1) + S(−1,t),
fi(−1,0) = fi(−1,+1) = Ri(−1), and fi(0,+1) = fi(0,−1) = fi(0,0) = 0. The utilityat time t, ui(σi(t)),
of the consumer i with the strategy σi(t) is deﬁned as the sum of the resultant payoﬀs obtained by playing
the games with the consumer i’s eight immediate neighbors:
ui(σi(t)) =
 
j∈˜ n(i)
fi(σi(t),σ j(t))
=( Ri(+1) + S(+1,t)pi(σi(t),t))
n0
2
σi(t)(σi(t)+1 )
+( Ri(−1) + S(−1,t)pi(σi(t),t))
n0
2
σi(t)(σi(t) − 1) (6)
where n0 stands for the number of neighbors and pi(σi(t),t) is the fraction of the agents with the strategy
5σi(t) among the immediate neighbors and given by
pi(σi(t),t)=
1
n0
 
j∈˜ n(i)
{
1
4
σi(t)(σi(t)+1 ) σj(t)(σj(t)+1 )
+
1
4
σi(t)(σi(t) − 1)σj(t)(σj(t) − 1)
+( σi(t) + 1)(σi(t) − 1)(σj(t) + 1)(σj(t) − 1)}
=
1
2n0
 
j∈˜ n(i)
{(3σ2
i(t) − 2)σ2
j(t)+σi(t)σj(t) − 2(σ2
i (t) − 1)} (7)
The updating rule adopted in this paper is so-called “copycat,” that is, the consumer i’s strategyat
time t + 1 is deﬁned as follows:
σi(t +1 )={σj(t) | uj(t) = max
j∈n(i)
uj(t)} (8)
where n(i) represents i’s neighborhood, which contains both ˜ n(i) and i itself. In the copycat, each consumer
imitates the most successful strategyin his neighborhood in terms of consumers’ utilities. The copycat is
adopted in this paper because it is commonlyobserved that people tryto imitate a strategyof their most
successful neighbor [2,22]. Note that switching costs that consumers paywhen theyswitch from the product
A to B or B to A are assumed to be negligible in this paper and set as zero for simplicity. If such costs are
highlysigniﬁcant, then consumers ʟincentive to switch their products dramaticallydecreases, therefore it
is expected that results of the simulations will be highlydependent on the initial conﬁgurations.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS OF THE MODEL
Simulations are conducted based on the rules of the game explained in the previous section. The results of
the extensive and intensive parameter running are shown in this section. The agents with the three distinct
strategies are homogeneouslyand randomlydistributed at time t = 1 in the game ﬁeld of two-dimensional
square lattice. Fiftyrealizations with ﬁftydiﬀerent initial random conﬁgurations are examined in order to
obtain the frequencies of three possible equilibria denoted as A∗,B ∗, and P∗. The symbol A∗ denotes the
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stands for a polymorphic equilibrium where the product A and B coexist. The small ﬂuctuation term in
payoﬀ, w, is ﬁxed as 0.001 in this paper.
Extensive parameter running is performed with regard to the combinations of three conditions, (ic),
(r), and (s), each of which stands for an initial fraction of agents who have the product A and who have
the product B, r(±1), and s(±1), respectively. The parameter sets are constructed as the combinations
of these three conditions. The condition (ic) has two categories that are (ic-1) {pA(1),p B(1),p C(1)} =
{10/1012,10/1012,1 − 20/1012} and (ic-2) {pA(1),p B(1),p C(1)} = {9/1012,11/1012,1 − 20/1012}. In the
case of (ic-1) there is symmetry in the initial number of those who adopt the product A and those who adopt
the product B. On the other hand, in the case of (ic-2), the product B is designed to have slight superiority
in number at initial point. The condition on the parameters r(±1) has three categories that are (r-1)
{r(+1),r(−1)} = {1,1}, (r-2) {r(+1),r(−1)} = {1,2}, and (r-3) {r(+1),r(−1)} = {2,1}. The condition
on the parameters s(±1) has four categories that are (s-1) {s(+1),s(−1)} = {0,0}, (s-2) {s(+1),s(−1)} =
{1,1}, (s-3) {s(+1),s(−1)} = {1,2}, and (s-4) {s(+1),s(−1)} = {2,1}. All the combinations of the above
three conditions count 24. However, only19 cases excluding one side of sy mmetric cases are examined.
Table II shows the frequencies of the equilibria A∗,B ∗, and P∗ for the 19 cases. The last column in
Table II will be explained in Sec. V. The time after which the system reaches an equilibrium depends on the
parameters ν and ξ in Eq. (2), and it is observed that t=150 (=t∗) is long enough for the system to reach
an equilibrium when ν = 1 and ξ =0 .5 are used.
In the cases 1 and 8, there are no eﬀects of the network externalities because both the parameters s(±1)
are set as zero. In such cases, it is observed that the system has stable polymorphic equilibria. Note that
even though there is symmetry in the initial number, the conﬁguration of the consumers with each strategy
is random. Due to this randomness the equilibria in the case 1 is not exactlyas {pA(t∗),p B(t∗),p C(t∗)} =
{0.5,0.5,0} but most likelyclose to these values. On the other hand, the poly morphic equilibria in the case 8
move slightlytoward B ∗ because of the product B’s slight superiorityin number at initial point. In the cases
72 and 9, now there exist positive and symmetric eﬀects of the network externalities on the product A and B
since the parameters s(±1) are set as the same non-zero value. In such cases, polymorphic equilibria tend
to bifurcate into either A∗ or B∗ and the system becomes sensitive to its initial conﬁguration and fraction.
In the case 2, it now can have three equilibria, A∗,B ∗,o rP ∗. The frequencies of those three equilibria are
distributed nearlyequallybecause of the sy mmetryin number in the condition (ic-1). In the case 9, however,
the system reaches B∗ more frequentlydue to the product B’s initial slight superiorityin number as in the
condition (ic-2). These results in the cases of 1, 2, 8, and 9 suggest that the existence of the positive eﬀects
of the network externalitymakes the sy stem inherent three stable equilibria, A ∗,B ∗, and P∗, and if there
is a diﬀerence in initial fraction between agents who adopt A and who does B, the diﬀerence is eventually
ampliﬁed and decides which equilibrium the system attains. This corresponds to the eﬀects of increasing
returns, which is discussed byArthur (1989) [1]. In contrast, without eﬀects of the network externalitythe
slight initial diﬀerence is not enlarged and both superior and inferior products are observed to coexist by
forming local clusters in the market (Figure of the game ﬁeld that contains local clusters is not shown).
In the cases of 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 13, and 14 the product B is designed to has a strict superiorityor
superiorities in its payoﬀ. As a result, in all those cases, the product B always takes over the market. The
same type of argument applies to the cases 11, 16, 17, and 19, but in these cases, the product A is the one
that takes over the market.
Interestinglyenough, in the cases of 7and 15, the product B still alway s takes over the market even
though the product A has a superiorityon its network externalityparameter s(+1) over s(−1) as seen in
the condition (s-4). This is because the product B has its superiorityon the parameter r(−1) over r(+1)
in addition to its initial number superiorityfor the case 15, and the level of the superiorityin network
externalityfor the product A could not overwhelm the product B’s superiority . It is expected that A ∗ could
be seen if s(+1) is set higher, and for example in the case of 7, it is observed that s(+1) = 6 is large enough
for the product A to most likelytake over the market as is shown in Table III. The explanation on the last
column in Table III will be given in Sec. V. The case 18 is symmetric against the case 15 except that not
8onlythe condition (s-3) but also the condition (ic-2) works against the product A, but the frequencyof A ∗
is still unitydue to the condition (r-3).
IV. INTRODUCING AN INNOVATION FACTOR
Now an innovation factor is introduced into the model. Table IV shows frequencies of the three equilibria,
A∗,B ∗, and P∗ when an innovation factor is introduced in the case 5 in Table II. The last column in Table
IV will be explained in Sec. V. For the cases 5(a), 5(b), and 5(c) in Table IV, all the parameters as well
as initial conditions are the same as the case 5 up to t = 24, and after t = 25 the parameter s(+1), now
denoted as s(+1,t≥ 25), is increased to 5(a) 2, 5(b) 4, and 5(c) 6, that is, an innovation is introduced to
the product A’s side at t = 25. One can see that the innovation factor 5(c) s(+1,t≥ 25) = 6 is large enough
for the product A to retake the market while 5(a) s(+1,t≥ 25) = 2 and 5(b) s(+1,t ≥ 25) = 4 are too
small. Figure 2(a) represents the trajectories of {pA(t),p B(t)} on the pA(t)-pB(t) plane with (triangle dots)
and without (black circles) the innovation factor s(+1,t≥ 25) = 6 in the case 5(c) in Table IV, respectively.
It is observed that the product A regains its market share after t = 25 and eventuallytakes over the whole
market. Here, note that introducing an innovation factor could make the system ﬁnally arrive a polymorphic
equilibrium as one can see in Table IV. On the other hand, in the case 5(d) in Table IV, the same size of
innovation factor as the case 5(c) is introduced but at time t = 35. In this case, the product B still always
takes over the market, that is, the time t = 35 is too late for the product A with the innovation factor given
as 6 or the innovation factor s(+1,t≥ 35) = 6 is too small for introducing at t = 35 to retake the market.
These results suggest that both the timing and size of the innovation factor matter for an inferior product
in order to retake the market.
Figure 2(b) illustrates the overall mean utilities corresponding to the Fig. 2(a) where the product A
successfullyretakes the market. The overall mean utilities denoted as UA(t) and UB(t) are deﬁned as
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UA(t)=
1
|NA(t)|
 
i∈NA(t)
ui(+1,t)
=
1
|NA(t)|
 
i∈NA(t)
n0{Ri(+1) + S(+1,t)pi(+1,t)}
= n0{r(+1) +
 
i∈NA(t) pi(+1,t)
|NA(t)|
s(+1)pA(t − 1)} (9)
UB(t)=
1
|NB(t)|
 
i∈NB(t)
ui(−1,t)
=
1
|NB(t)|
 
i∈NB(t)
n0{Ri(−1) + S(−1,t)pi(−1,t)}
= n0{r(−1) +
 
i∈NB(t) pi(−1,t)
|NB(t)|
s(−1)pB(t − 1)} (10)
where ui(±1,t)=ui(σi(t)=±1), NA(t) and NB(t) are the sets of agents who consume the product A and
Bi nN, respectively, |NA(t)| and |NB(t)| are the size of the sets NA(t) and NB(t), respectively. The ex
and square dots represent UA(t) and UB(t), respectively, in Fig 2(a). Equations (9) and (10) are the key
factors to control the equilibrium of the system since utility functions realize all the parameters in payoﬀs,
which decide the payoﬀ matrix on which the system mainly is dependent. As in Fig. 2(b), when the inferior
product A comes from behind to retake the market due to the innovation factor, there exists crossover of
UA(t) and UB(t). This fact is utilized when a mean-ﬁeld theoryis constructed to recover the results of the
simulations.
V. MEAN-FIELD THEORY
In this section, a mean-ﬁeld approximation is conducted to recover the results of the simulations in the
previous section. Here we introduce the local densities of i’s neighbors who are adopting either the strategy
A, B, or C at time t that are given as  i(+1,t),  i(−1,t), and  i(0,t), respectively, as follows:
 i(σ,t)=
1
2(n0 +1 )
 
j∈n(i)
{(3σ2 − 2)σ2
j(t)+σσj(t) − 2(σ2 − 1)} (11)
10where σ =+ 1 ,−1, or 0. Now, if we let σM
k∈n(i)(t) symbolize the σi(t + 1) that satisﬁes the right hand side
of Eq. (8), then from Eq. (11) the time evolutions of the local densities are given as
 i(+1,t+1 )−  i(+1,t)=
1
2(n0 +1 )
 
j∈˜ n(i)
{(σ
M
k∈n(i)(t))
2 − σ
2
j(t)+( σ
M
k∈n(i)(t) − σj(t))}
=
1
2(n0 +1 )
{
 
j∈˜ n(i)
σj(t)(σj(t) − 1)
σM
k∈n(j)(t)(σM
k∈n(j)(t)+1 )
2
−
 
j∈˜ n(i)
σj(t)(σj(t)+1 )
σM
k∈n(j)(t)(σM
k∈n(j)(t) − 1)
2
+
 
j∈˜ n(i)
2(1 + σj(t))(1 − σj(t))
σM
k∈n(j)(t)(σM
k∈n(j)(t)+1 )
2
}, (12)
 i(−1,t+1 )−  i(−1,t)=
1
2(n0 +1 )
 
j∈˜ n(i)
{(σM
k∈n(i)(t))2 − σ2
j(t) − (σM
k∈n(i)(t) − σj(t))}
=
1
2(n0 +1 )
{−
 
j∈˜ n(i)
σj(t)(σj(t) − 1)
σM
k∈n(j)(t)(σM
k∈n(j)(t)+1 )
2
+
 
j∈˜ n(i)
σj(t)(σj(t)+1 )
σM
k∈n(j)(t)(σM
k∈n(j)(t) − 1)
2
+
 
j∈˜ n(i)
2(1 + σj(t))(1 − σj(t))
σM
k∈n(j)(t)(σM
k∈n(j)(t) − 1)
2
}, (13)
and
 i(0,t+1 )−  i(0,t)=
1
2(n0 +1 )
 
j∈˜ n(i)
(−2){(σM
k∈n(i)(t))2 − σ2
j(t)}
=
1
2(n0 +1 )
{−
 
j∈˜ n(i)
2(1 + σj(t))(1 − σj(t))(σM
k∈n(j)(t))2}. (14)
Here the global densities of the strategyA, B, and C consumers are introduced as
pA(t)=
1
|N|
 
i∈N
 i(+1,t), (15)
pB(t)=
1
|N|
 
i∈N
 i(−1,t), and (16)
pC(t)=
1
|N|
 
i∈N
 i(0,t), (17)
respectively, where N is the set of the whole customers. Certainlyit holds
pA(t)+pB(t)+pC(t)=1 . (18)
11Now the local densities  i(+1,t),  i(−1,t), and  i(0,t) are replaced bythe global density pA(t), pB(t),
and pC(t), respectively, and the following equations are obtained:
1
|N|
 
i∈N
[  i(±1,t+1 )−  i(±1,t)]
= ±Pr(σM
k∈n(j∈n(i))(t)=+ 1|∀ i ∈ B)
1
|N|
 
i∈N
1
2(n0 +1 )
 
j∈˜ n(i)
σj(t)(σj(t) − 1)
∓Pr(σ
M
k∈n(j∈n(i))(t)=−1 |∀ i ∈ A)
1
|N|
 
i∈N
1
2(n0 +1 )
 
j∈˜ n(i)
σj(t)(σj(t)+1 )
+Pr(σM
k∈n(j∈n(i))(t)=±1 |∀ i ∈ C)
1
|N|
 
i∈N
1
2(n0 +1 )
 
j∈˜ n(i)
2(1 + σj(t))(1 − σj(t)) (19)
and
1
|N|
 
i∈N
[  i(0,t+1 )−  i(0,t)]
= Pr(σM
k∈n(j∈n(i))(t)=+ 1∪− 1 |∀ i ∈ C)
1
|N|
 
i∈N
1
2(n0 +1 )
 
j∈˜ n(i)
2(1 + σj(t))(1 − σj(t)) (20)
that lead to
pA(t +1 )− pA(t)= α(t) pB(t) − β(t) pA(t)+γ(t) pC(t), (21)
pB(t +1 )− pB(t)=−α(t) pB(t)+β(t) pA(t)+δ(t) pC(t), and (22)
pC(t +1 )− pC(t)=− (t) pC(t) (23)
where α(t), β(t), γ(t), δ(t), and  (t) are transition probabilities and therefore approximated as
α(t)=Pr(σM
k∈n(j∈n(i))(t)=+ 1|∀ i ∈ B)
 



a
2{1 + sign[ˆ UA(t) − ˆ UB(t)]} if pA(1)  =0
0 otherwise
(24)
β(t)=Pr(σ
M
k∈n(j∈n(i))(t)=−1 |∀ i ∈ A)
 



b
2{1 + sign[ˆ UB(t) − ˆ UA(t)]} if pB(1)  =0
0 otherwise
(25)
12γ(t)=Pr(σM
k∈n(j∈n(i))(t)=+ 1|∀ i ∈ C)
 



k(1 − pC(t)) if pA(1)  =0
0 otherwise
(26)
δ(t)=Pr(σM
k∈n(j∈n(i))(t)=−1 |∀ i ∈ C)
 



k (1 − pC(t)) if pB(1)  =0
0 otherwise
(27)
 (t)=Pr(σM
k∈n(j∈n(i))(t)=+ 1∪− 1 |∀ i ∈ C)
= γ(t)+δ(t) (28)
where a,b,k, and k  (0 <a ,b ,k ,k   < 1) are parameters that controls the magnitude of transition probabilities,
and sign[0] is assumed to be -1, that is, α(t) and β(t) are zero when ˆ UA(t)=ˆ UB(t) holds. From Eqs (9)
and (10), the global average utilities for the A and B consumers, ˆ UA(t) and ˆ UB(t) in Eqs. (24) and (25), are
approximated as
ˆ UA(t)=n0{r(+1) + s(+1)p(+1)pA(t − 1)} (29)
ˆ UB(t)=n0{r(−1) + s(−1)p(−1)pB(t − 1)} (30)
where p(+1) and p(−1) (0 ≤ p(±) ≤ 1) are positive parameters that represent the mean values of pi(+1,t)
and pi(−1,t) over i, respectively. These mean values could approximately be ﬁxed as nearly unity over time
since those who have either A or B essentiallyform clusters in order to survive no matter what values pA(t)
and pB(t) are. Onlyexceptions are the cases where either pA(t)o rpB(t) are nearlyzero or zero. However,
in those cases the values of the parameters p(+1) and p(−1) do not matter since pA(t) and pB(t) are nearly
zero or zero.
The last columns in Tables II, III, and IV show equilibria that are approximated bynumericallysolving
Eqs. (21) to (23) with Eqs. (24) to (28). The parameters a (= b), k (= k ), and p(+1) (= p(−1)) are
13chosen as 0.08, λ/2=0.16, and 1, respectively. The parameter k (= k ) is set as λ/2 so that 1 − pC(t)
(= pA(t)+pB(t)) can be described bythe logistic equation in Eq. (1) whose parameter is λ. One can see
that the mean-ﬁeld theorywith the above parameters successfullyapproximates the equilibria the sy stem
most likelyreaches.
The trajectoryof {pA(t),p B(t)} and overall mean utilities, ˆ UA(t) and ˆ UB(t), which are approximated by
the above mean-ﬁeld theory, are shown in Figs. 3(a) and (b), respectively. These ﬁgures correspond to the
case in Figs. 2(a) and (b), respectively, which are obtained as a result of a simulation. It is observed that
the generous features of Figs. 2(a) and (b) are successfullyrecovered byFigs. 3(a) and (b).
VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper the diﬀusion phenomena of two competitive, interchangeable, and durable goods have been
studied based on the framework of the spatial 3×3 symmetric coordination like-game. The payoﬀ matrix
of the game contains the positive eﬀects of the network externalities that aﬀect the payoﬀ matrix itself
dynamically by providing feedbacks to the system from the system itself.
Both the simulations and the mean-ﬁeld approximation have shown that the existence of the positive
eﬀects of the network externalitymakes the sy stem inherent three stable equilibria, A ∗,B ∗, and P∗, and
if there is a diﬀerence in initial fraction between agents who adopt A and who does B, the diﬀerence is
eventuallyampliﬁed that decides which equilibrium the sy stem reaches. On the other hand, without the
eﬀects of the network externalitythe slight initial diﬀerence is not enlarged and both superior and inferior
products are observed to coexist byforming local clusters in the market. Additionally , from the studyon the
model with an innovation factor, it is shown that both the timing and size of the innovation factor matter
for an inferior product in order to retake the market.
In the future, we hope to introduce a random connection between consumers into the model.
14Tables I to IV
Table I
StrategyA (+1) StrategyB ( −1) StrategyC (0)
StrategyA (+1) Ri(+1) + S(+1,t) Ri(+1) Ri(+1)
StrategyB ( −1) Ri(−1) Ri(−1) + S(−1,t) Ri(−1)
StrategyC (0) 0 0 0
Payoﬀ matrix for a row player. The deﬁnitions of Ri(±1) and S(±1,t) are given in Eq. (3), and (4) and (5),
respectively.
15Table II
Conditions Case Frequencies of Equilibria M.F.
ic r s No. A∗ P∗ B∗ Approx.
(ic-1) (r-1) (s-1) 1 0 1 0 P∗
(s-2) 2 0.38 0.36 0.26 P∗
(s-3) 3 0 0 1 B∗
(s-4) - - - - -
(r-2) (s-1) 4 0 0 1 B∗
(s-2) 5 0 0 1 B∗
(s-3) 6 0 0 1 B∗
(s-4) 7 0 0 1 B∗
(ic-2) (r-1) (s-1) 8 0 1 0 P∗
(s-2) 9 0.06 0.16 0.78 B∗
(s-3) 10 0 0 1 B∗
(s-4) 11 1 0 0 A∗
(r-2) (s-1) 12 0 0 1 B∗
(s-2) 13 0 0 1 B∗
(s-3) 14 0 0 1 B∗
(s-4) 15 0 0 1 B∗
(r-3) (s-1) 16 1 0 0 A∗
(s-2) 17 1 0 0 A∗
(s-3) 18 1 0 0 A∗
(s-4) 19 1 0 0 A∗
Frequencies of the equilibria A∗,B ∗, and P∗. The symbol A∗ denotes the equilibrium where the prod-
uct A takes over the whole market, and B∗ for the product B. The symbol P∗ stands for a polymorphic
equilibrium where the product A and B coexist. The parameter sets are constructed as the combinations
of the following three conditions, (ic), (r), and (s). The condition (ic) has two categories that are (ic-1)
{pA(1),p B(1),p C(1)} = {10/1012,10/1012,1−20/1012} and (ic-2) {pA(1),p B(1),p C(1)} = {9/1012,11/1012,1−
20/1012}. The condition on the parameters r(±1) has three categories that are (r-1) {r(+1),r(−1)} = {1,1},
(r-2) {r(+1),r(−1)} = {1,2}, and (r-3) {r(+1),r(−1)} = {2,1}. The condition on the parameters s(±1) has
four categories that are (s-1) {s(+1),s(−1)} = {0,0}, (s-2) {s(+1),s(−1)} = {1,1}, (s-3) {s(+1),s(−1)} =
16{1,2}, and (s-4) {s(+1),s(−1)} = {2,1}. All the combinations of the above three conditions count 24. How-
ever, only19 cases excluding one side of sy mmetric cases are examined. The last columns show equilibria
that are approximated bythe mean-ﬁeld theoryin Sec. V.
17Table III
Conditions Frequencies of Equilibria M.F.
ic r s s(−1), s(+1) A∗ P∗ B∗ Approx.
(ic-1) (r-2) (s-4) 1,2 0 0 1 B∗
1,3 0 0 1 B∗
1,4 0.04 0 0.96 B∗
1,5 0.34 0.06 0.6 B∗
1,6 0.76 0.06 0.18 A∗
1,7 0.98 0 0.02 A∗
1,8 1 0 0 A∗
1,9 1 0 0 A∗
1, 1 0 1 0 0 A∗
The results of the intensive parameter running for the case 7 in Table II. The parameter s(+1) = 6 is large
enough for the product A to take over the market most likely. The last columns show equilibria that are
approximated bythe mean-ﬁeld theoryin Sec. V.
18Table IV
Conditions Case Frequencies of Equilibria M.F.
ic r s No. A∗ P∗ B∗ Approx.
(ic-1) (r-2) (s-2) 5(a) 0 0 1 B∗
5(b) 0.04 0 0.96 B∗
5(c) 0.72 0.06 0.22 A∗
5(d) 0 0 1 B∗
Frequencies of the three equilibria, A∗,B ∗, and P∗ when an innovation factor is introduced in the case 5
in Table II. The innovation factor 5(c) s(+1,t≥ 25) = 6 is large enough for the product A to retake the
market while 5(a) s(+1,t≥ 25) = 2 and 5(b) 4 are too small. In the case 5(d), the product B still always
takes over the market, that is, the time t = 35 is too late for the product A with the innovation factor given
as 6 or the innovation factor s(+1,t≥ 35) = 6 is too small for introducing at t = 35 to retake the market.
These results suggest that both the timing and size of the innovation factor matter for an inferior product
in order to retake the market. The last columns show equilibria that are approximated bythe mean-ﬁeld
theoryin Sec. V.
19Figure Captions
FIGURE 1
Numericallysolved pX(t) (square dots) in Eq. (1) with the initial value pX(1)=20/1012 and the parameter
λ=0.32 and the value pX(t) (black circles) that is obtained as a result of the cellular-automata based
simulation with the initial value pX(1)=20/1012 and the parameters ν=1 and ξ =0 .5. The two curves are
almost identical, and it suggests that pX(t) obtained from the simulation could be described bythe logistic
equation in Eq. (1). This fact will be utilized later in Sec. V where a mean-ﬁeld theoryis conducted.
FIGURE 2
The results from the simulations in the case 5 with the innovation factor. (a) The trajectories of {pA(t),p B(t)}
on the pA(t)-pB(t) plane with (triangle dots) and without (black circles) the innovation factor s(+1,t≥ 25) =
6, respectively. (b) The overall mean utilities corresponding to the case with the innovation factor in Fig.
2(a). The ex and square dots are for UA(t) and UB(t), respectively.
FIGURE 3
The results from the mean-ﬁeld approximation that are corresponding to the case in Figs. 2. The parameters
a (= b), k (= k ), and p(+1) (= p(−1)) are chosen as 0.08, λ/2=0.16, and 1, respectively. (a) The trajectories
of {pA(t),p B(t)} to A∗ and B∗ on the pA(t)-pB(t) plane with and without the innovation factor s(+1,t≥
25) = 6, respectively. (b) The overall mean utilities corresponding to the Fig. 3(a) where the product A
successfullyretakes the market.
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